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We study sovereign bond yields in OECD countries with a dynamic panel by checking for cross-section dependence; 
assessing panel cointegration; and estimating panel error-correction models. The results show that markets consider 
budgetary and external imbalances and inflation as relevant determinants of sovereign yields.
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     1. Introduction 
The long-run relationship between fiscal variables and sovereign bond yields 
constitutes part of policymakers’ conventional wisdom. Increases in the debt ratio or in 
the government deficit ratio may imply an increase in long-term interest rates, by 
impinging negatively on credit risk and on the quality of the outstanding debt. Under 
such conditions market participants perceive an additional risk stemming from the 
loosening of fiscal stance (Ardagna et al., 2004), while liquidity risk also plays a role 
notably in times of market unrest (Beber et al., 2009).
1 Moreover, fiscal developments 
are relevant determinants of sovereign ratings (Afonso et al., 2010). 
We assess the long-run determinants of real long-term sovereign yields in the 
OECD employing a dynamic panel approach to test for the existence of cointegration. 
Furthermore, we also consider cross-country dependence (for instance, common fiscal 
behaviour, notably in the European Union, financial markets’ integration and 
liberalisation, business cycle synchronization), and estimate a complete panel error-
correction model to uncover the short-run parameters. Results show that budgetary and 
external imbalances and inflation determine sovereign yields. 
 
2. Methodology 
The specification for the real long-term sovereign yield, r, is  
  () it it it i i it it ri X u πα γ =− =+ +. (1) 
where i is the long-term nominal sovereign yield, π is the inflation rate, and X includes 
additional explanatory variables. i denotes the country, t indicates the period, αi stands 
for the individual effects for each country i, and the disturbances uit follow the standard 
assumptions.  
An error-correction form for the real long-term interest rates is given by  
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where the disturbances vit follow the standard assumptions. 
Among the several long-run factors influencing the long-term sovereign yields, we 
consider the budget balance ratio, the debt ratio, the current account balance ratio, and 
inflation. 
                                                 
1 See Orr, Edey, and Kennedy (1995), Codogno et al. (2003), and Laubach (2009).   2
Since with high inflation governments can partially inflate away fiscal 
indebtedness, the need for a higher nominal and real long-term bond yields cannot be 
discarded. Therefore, we build a measure of inflation surprises (π
e) taking the difference 
between actual inflation and a 2-year moving average of past inflation. 
Moreover, external imbalances are linked to fiscal imbalances, notably when 
private savings do not increase sufficiently to offset the effects of higher budget deficits, 
therefore, impinging via such channel also on long-term bond yields.  
 
3. Analysis 
For the period 1973-2008 we consider the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, and U.S.
2 
To test for cross-section dependence we use the test of Pesaran (2004) by 
computing the Cross section Dependence statistic, and we can reject the null of cross-
section independence. Moreover, using a 2
nd  generation unit root test from Pesaran 
(2007), with the null being the unit root, results support the existence of a unit root in all 
series.
3 
We then apply the bootstrap panel cointegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007), which accommodates correlation within and between individual cross-sections. 
In case of non-rejection of the null, we can assume that there is cointegration between 
real long-term interest rates and their determinants. 
The asymptotic test results (Table 1) indicate the absence of cointegration. 
However, this is computed on the assumption of cross-sectional independence, not the 
case in our panel. Consequently, we also used bootstrap critical values. In this case we 
conclude that there is a long-run relationship between real long-term interest rates and 
their determinants, implying that over the longer run real they move together.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Government Bond Yield, IFS 61.Z.F, International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. Consumer Price 
Index, IFS 64.XZF, IFS, IMF. Government debt ratio, 1.0.319.0.UDGGL, European Commission (EC) 
AMECO. Budget balance-to-GDP ratio, 1.0.319.0.UBLGE, EC AMECO. GDP at market prices, 
1.0.0.0.UVGD, EC AMECO. Current Balance, % of GDP, CBGDPR, Balance of Payments, OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
3 Results are available from the authors. Trending turned out not to be very pronounced and the results are 
not very sensitive to the inclusion of a trend in addition to a constant in the estimated equation. We also 
checked using the tests of Pesaran (2007) and the bootstrap tests of Smith et al. (2004) that first 
differences are stationary.   3
Table 1 – Panel cointegration between Real Long-Term Interest Rates and determinants 
(with a constant) 
 
 





e, CA, DR)  7.430  0.000  0.840 
X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR)  7.385  0.000  0.782 
Notes: bootstrap based on 2000 replications. 
a - null hypothesis: cointegration of Real Long-Term Interest Rates and determinant series. 
# Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
Therefore, we estimate the system of long-run relationships (one by country), 
given by equation (1), by the Zellner approach to handle cross-sectional dependence 
using the SUR estimator. Results in Table 2 show that real sovereign yields are 
statistically and positively affected by changes in the debt ratio in 12 countries. Inflation 
has a statistically significant negative effect on real long-term interest rates in ten cases. 
Since improvements in the external balance reduce real sovereign yields in ten 
countries, the deterioration of current account balances may signal a widening gap 
between savings and investment, pushing long-term interest rates upwards. Moreover, 
when the budget balance ratio is used (Table 3) a better fiscal balance reduces the real 
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Table 2 – SUR estimation, X1= (Π
e, CA, DR) 
Country Coefficients  t-Statistic Probab.  Country  Coefficients  t-Statistic  Probab. 
Austria const  7.305 11.510 0.000 Luxembourg const  -0.935 -17.980 0.000
  Π
e  -0.717 -13.415 0.000   Π
e  0.231 6.819 0.000
 CA  -0.304  -9.177 0.000   CA  0.063 1.351  0.177
 DR  -0.029  -3.244 0.001   DR  4.256 6.416  0.000
Belgium const  1.050 1.598 0.111 Netherlands  const  -0.521 -10.642 0.000
  Π
e  -0.576 -12.520 0.000   Π
e  -0.309 -7.084 0.000
 CA  -0.772  -17.248 0.000   CA  0.038 4.414  0.000
 DR  0.065  12.607 0.000   DR  0.005 0.003  0.998
Canada const  1.858 1.940 0.053 Portugal  const  -0.460 -11.272 0.000
  Π
e  -0.377 -6.455 0.000   Π
e  0.386 6.071 0.000
 CA  -0.226  -4.541 0.000   CA  0.140 5.447  0.000
 DR  0.049  4.776 0.000   DR  11.491 6.876  0.000
Denmark const  0.281 0.436 0.663 Spain const  -0.853 -11.572 0.000
  Π
e  0.039 0.573 0.567   Π
e  0.561 7.068 0.000
 CA  -0.250  -3.375 0.001   CA  -0.033 -1.336  0.182
 DR  0.080  10.204 0.000   DR  2.351 2.558  0.011
Finland const  11.673 14.894 0.000 Sweden const  -0.545 -8.673 0.000
  Π
e  -1.123 -17.669 0.000   Π
e  -0.330 -4.807 0.000
 CA  -0.389  -8.224 0.000   CA  0.087 7.253  0.000
 DR  -0.068  -4.125 0.000   DR  4.899 5.235  0.000
France const  11.197 16.550 0.000 UK  const  -0.578 -18.412 0.000
  Π
e  -0.773 -18.527 0.000   Π
e  0.305 3.717 0.000
 CA  -0.414  -6.566 0.000   CA  0.040 2.211  0.027
 DR  -0.104  -8.965 0.000   DR  7.897 18.106  0.000
Germany const  8.093 16.096 0.000 Japan  const  -0.879 -28.964 0.000
  Π
e  -0.663 -13.594 0.000   Π
e  -0.152 -1.593 0.112
 CA  -0.064  -2.186 0.029   CA  -0.036 -9.675  0.000
 DR  -0.053  -6.574 0.000   DR  11.484 11.167  0.000
Ireland const  0.346 0.875 0.382 U.S.  const  -0.932 -19.099 0.000
  Π
e  -0.530 -16.331 0.000   Π
e  0.331 5.057 0.000
 CA  -0.204  -5.620 0.000  CA  -0.064 -4.265  0.000
 DR  0.079  18.191 0.000  DR  -0.935 -17.980  0.000
Italy const  -0.133 -0.063 0.950      
  Π
e  -0.383 -5.349 0.000      
 CA  0.086 0.808 0.420      
 DR  0.062 3.494 0.001      
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Table 3 – SUR estimation, X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR) 
Country Coefficients  t-Statistic Probab.  Country  Coefficients  t-Statistic  Probab. 
Austria const  4.815 15.391 0.000 Luxembourg const  3.852 8.346 0.000
  Π
e  -0.488 -9.391 0.000   Π
e  -0.964 -21.013 0.000
 CA  -0.286  -6.190 0.000   CA  0.206 6.006  0.000
 GBR  -0.080  -1.233 0.218   GBR  -0.021 -0.421  0.674
Belgium const  5.441 14.197 0.000 Netherlands  const  5.494 13.366 0.000
  Π
e  -0.844 -19.923 0.000   Π
e  -0.557 -12.082 0.000
 CA  -0.214  -3.564 0.000   CA  -0.212 -3.933  0.000
 GBR  -0.392  -12.136 0.000   GBR  -0.298 -5.395  0.000
Canada const  5.285 17.943 0.000 Portugal const  5.644 9.346 0.000
  Π
e  -0.561 -13.562 0.000   Π
e  -0.685 -26.644 0.000
 CA  0.027  0.422 0.673   CA  0.371 8.736  0.000
 GBR  -0.351  -8.788 0.000   GBR  -0.771 -10.086  0.000
Denmark const  6.086 20.367 0.000 Spain  const  4.748 6.404 0.000
  Π
e  -0.361 -7.029 0.000   Π
e  -0.595 -13.076 0.000
 CA  -0.435  -6.633 0.000   CA  0.008 0.097  0.922
 GBR  -0.467  -11.140 0.000   GBR  -0.724 -6.999  0.000
Finland const  9.304 21.059 0.000 Sweden const  8.516 19.727 0.000
  Π
e  -1.048 -16.989 0.000   Π
e  -0.847 -17.010 0.000
 CA  -0.413  -8.572 0.000   CA  -0.476 -8.002  0.000
 GBR  0.018  0.393 0.695   GBR  -0.090 -2.871  0.004
France const  5.152 11.254 0.000 UK  const  6.569 15.468 0.000
  Π
e  -0.548 -12.871 0.000   Π
e  -0.629 -21.870 0.000
 CA  -0.374  -5.301 0.000   CA  0.236 2.854  0.005
 GBR  -0.198  -2.404 0.017   GBR  -0.159 -3.024  0.003
Germany const  4.700 17.069 0.000 Japan  const  7.469 14.237 0.000
  Π
e  -0.381 -8.285 0.000   Π
e  -0.919 -20.591 0.000
 CA  -0.061  -1.947 0.052   CA  -0.993 -7.246  0.000
 GBR  -0.062  -1.372 0.171   GBR  0.256 5.033  0.000
Ireland const  5.951 17.211 0.000 U.S.  const  6.611 12.136 0.000
  Π
e  -0.775 -19.682 0.000   Π
e  -0.750 -12.057 0.000
 CA  0.017  0.408 0.683  CA  0.104 1.137  0.256
 GBR  -0.489  -13.543 0.000  GBR  0.036 0.496  0.620
Italy const  4.209 7.338 0.000      
  Π
e  -0.682 -17.039 0.000      
 CA  0.250 2.588 0.010      
 GBR  -0.498 -8.166 0.000      
Note: linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced system, total observations: 612. 
  
To estimate the complete panel error-correction model given in (2) we recover 
from each of the cointegration relations the estimated coefficients to construct the 
residual quantity () it it i it iX πγ ⎡⎤ −− ⎣⎦ . Afterwards, we estimate a complete VAR in first 
differences, with country effects, αi, with the necessary lags of the abovementioned 
residual variable. The lag length structure k is chosen using the Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn selection criteria, and by carrying out a standard likelihood ratio testing-down 
type procedure, to examine the lag significance from a long-lag structure (started with 
k=6) to a more parsimonious one. In order to improve the statistical specification of the 
model, we systematically implemented Wald tests of exclusion of variables from the 
short-run dynamic (not reported here) to eliminate insignificant short-run estimates at 
the 5% level. The results of the estimations using Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood are reported in Table 4.   6
 
Table 4 – Error-correction estimates for Δ rit 
X1= (Π
e, CA, DR), short-run parameters







-0.2910  0.137722  0.229459 0.08515 0.190028 
[-7.49]  [2.47] [7.07] [2.47] [5.76] 
Loading factorδ       
0.163733      
[3.13]      
 
X2= (Π








-0.198459  0.195994 0.059376 0.138118 
[-4.79] [5.04]  [2.00]  [3.60 
ΔCAit-1 ΔGBR it-4   
0.164672 -0.15368    
[2.87] [-2.34]    
Loading factorδ       
0.128283     
[2.39]     
Note: total observations, 560; t-statistics in brackets.  
r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; π
e – inflation surprises; DR – debt ratio; 
GBR – budget balance ratio.  
 
Inflation has a significant short-run effect on real long-term sovereign yields, and 
a fall in inflation would imply a decline in real rates. Interestingly, the long-run effect 
associated with the panel results (Table 4), can in this case be computed to be around -
0.4. This is in line with the long-run cointegration relationship reported for the countries 
in the previous SUR analysis, and implies that an increase in inflation surprises of 1 
percentage point could lead to a long-run decline of around 0.4 percentage point in the 
real long-term interest rate. Regarding the short-run effects of the fiscal determinants, an 
improvement of the government budget balance also reduces the real interest rate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We studied the long-run behaviour of sovereign yields for OECD countries, for 
the period 1973-2008. The use of a dynamic panel approach allowed to reflect financial 
and economic integration, and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In 
this framework, cross-country dependences in the sovereign bond segment of the capital 
markets were also taken into account. 
We rejected cross-section independence for the real long-term interest rates (and 
for its determinants). From an economic point of view such cross-section dependence 
provides evidence of capital markets integration in the OECD. After having established   7
with 2
nd generation panel unit root tests that all the series in the panel are I(1), we 
undertook a bootstrap panel cointegration analysis.  
Finally, our analysis shows that better government budget balances mostly reduce 
real sovereign yields, while higher sovereign indebtedness increases them. Additionally, 
deteriorating current account balances, signalling a widening gap between savings and 
investment, push sovereign yields upwards. 
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